Let us proceed from the premise that albeit the discourse on the concepts of multipolarity or polycentricity is indeed taking place today, it appears unproductive.

There are several reasons for that, the first being the mere absence of holistic scientific definitions of the phenomena. The exponents of different schools of thought and methodologies, as well as researchers from different countries examining various aspects of international relations hold to diverging opinions regarding not only the essence of multipolarity or polycentricity, but likewise the criteria defining them¹ [1; 2, pp.18-25; 3; 4, pp.424-445; 5, pp.16-17; 6; 7]. Although the diversity of arguments presented all deserve attention, they do not contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the substance of these notions, with the statement of the three following rather obvious yet not indisputable facts as the only common features that various approaches share in common:

The second reason is that the emergence of the concept of multipolarity/polycentricity manifests rather an expectation or hope for the prospects of building a novel and more fair world order, which could arise after the collapse of the bipolar system shaped by the confrontation (largely ideological, although this is not indisputable either) of the two blocs – capitalist and socialist – and the unipolar system in the form of Pax Americana that had replaced it but has also exhausted its potential² [8, p.60; 9; 2, pp.9-17; 10, pp.86-97; 11, pp.159-160; 12].

The extent to which this hope has come true is a debatable issue, since the main conditions for its existence are absent today. On the one hand, the UN Charter undoubtedly represents a good framework, i.e. the rules and guidelines, that should regulate the interactions and behavior of all centers of power without exception, yet the problem is that the principles and norms contained therein are either ignored or executed rather selectively. On the other hand, national political leaders seem to lack the ability and desire to engage in a constructive dialogue instead of demonstrating their superiority based on the “rule of force”.
The unfortunate reality is that as the number of comparable centers of power is expanding, and the likelihood of their interests coinciding is falling, which means that the negotiating field for arriving at a compromise among the influential international system actors is shrinking.

A no less significant fact is the currently observed extremely low quality of ruling elites, if not their moral and intellectual degradation, not to mention their overwhelming impotence to make independent decisions.
The third reason is yet another noteworthy fact that while the concepts of “multipolar world” and “polycentric system” are still present in the scientific discourse, references to them in the political documents of certain countries deemed the so-called “centers of power” are becoming increasingly rare. China represents a striking example of this. In his address to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping's used the term “multipolar world” only once, and didn’t refer to it at all in his statement at the 20th CPC National Congress.

This most likely confirms the fact that the idea of a multipolar world is practically not operational in today's conditions. In its development, China has obviously reached the level when it is not only capable of offering an alternative to the sole US dominance, but can also evade the confrontational bloc rhetoric by betting on its traditional “soft power”, i.e. profitable investment projects, as well as China’s ideas regarding a new world architecture presented to the world community.

It would be rather far-fetched to predict China turning into a single global dominating center of power in the nearest future, but it is possible to overlook neither its consolidating force in the emerging polycentric world nor the formation of new alliances based on the “China+” formula, at the same time being frank about the falling negative perceptions as for cooperating with China.

Finally, the main question is: to what extent can the ideas of a multipolar world or polycentricity contribute to the safeguarding of peace and universal inclusive development? The author considers relevant citing the qualification of multipolarity that Dr. Condoleezza Rice gave back in 2003 serving as the US President Advisor for National Security Affairs – “… “multi-polarity” was never a unifying idea, or a vision. It was a necessary evil that sustained the absence of war but it did not promote the triumph of peace. Multi-polarity is a theory of rivalry; of competing interests – and at its worst – competing values”[p. 78]. Although this was said in the context of supporting the Pax Americana concept (due to the fact that in those years the level of negotiability of political leaders was significantly higher than today, and therefore the very idea of multipolarity was popular), in essence it was a correct description of the phenomenon.

Over the past decades, the corresponding hopes and expectations have not become any brighter. On the contrary, the relationships between old and new centers of power have grown bolder and tougher, and the field for reaching consensus narrower. Acknowledging the absence of uniform “rules of the game” in the “sandbox” called planet Earth, and the negotiability of political leaders approaching zero (for various reasons), it is quite easy to lose firm ground.

What are the attributes of the current stage of multipolar world development?

Returning to Central Asia, one cannot fail to notice the multitude of region-specific challenges, as it is happening in any other part of the world. They are driven by various causes – both internal and external in nature, as well as the exposure to the geopolitical processes taking place inside the region and on the global scale. Since the article’s theme is limited to the influence of external players, let’s put country-level and intraregional threats and challenges aside and focus on these of extra-regional origin.

As mentioned above, such threats and challenges are primarily associated with the modification of the “rules of the game” in world politics and international relations, and the rising competition among the centers of power inside Central Asia. Among the broad spectrum of challenges, the following appear to be most significant.

In this regard, three main circumstances are noteworthy.

Firstly, neither the countries of Central Asia nor Russia are able to counteract China's economic penetration into the region. Moreover, this does not make sense, given the fact that economic interactions with China are mutually beneficial, and China is a more significant partner for Central Asia than the region is for China.

Secondly, at present China is no longer seen as a source of potential threat, not only by the political establishment, but also by the populations of Central Asian states. In addition, China has moved to the category of a desirable foreign policy and foreign economic partner; and in terms of regional security, it is sometimes considered as an absolutely worthy alternative not only to Western countries, but likewise to Russia.

Thirdly, one cannot fail to say that China has in fact become a moderator of the process of forming a new regional security architecture. It's easy to verify this statement just by carefully looking at China’s foreign policy initiatives and comparing them with the provisions laid out in the most recent SCO documents. In the course of the previous 10 years, it was China that initiated new regional security approaches. All of the Central Asia countries and Russia are merely repeating China's proposals.

Yet, all of the above does not mean that the region may calm down and forget about the risks posed by China. There should be no euphoria regarding relations with China, which is unfortunately something that one might observe today. One should understand that in case of China Central Asia is dealing not only with the leading power in Asia, but also with a country, one of the foreign policy stratagems of which is the postulate of “a wise monkey sitting on top of the mountain to watch the two tigers fight in the valley below”. The main thing is not to fall into the clutches of this “monkey” after the “tigers” are exhausted.

No doubt China will strive to do mainly what is in its national interests, and at some stage this may come into conflict not only with the strategy of the West or Russia, but also with the national interests of the Central Asia states.

Indeed, one can talk with China on equal terms, but only when it acknowledges the significance and strength of its dialogue partner. Since neither individual Central Asia countries nor Russia are likely to be able to compete with China in the near future, there arises the need to forge a mechanism of joining forces.

That is why, firstly, the countries of Central Asia can benefit from the strategy, on the one hand, allowing to leverage China's growing interest (primarily economic) in the region advantageous for their national economies; but, on the other hand, creating strategic conditions ensuring a limited presence of China.

Secondly, as China's closest neighbors and strategic partners, Central Asian states should “have their finger on the pulse”. This is possible only based on a comprehensive and constant study of the current developments in China. Regrettably, no country of the region can boast of carrying out such research of full scale and proper quality.

Finally, one should be aware that a strong China is a challenge, yet a weak, disintegrating, and out-of-control China is a threat that cannot be overstated.

As to the actual centers of power present in the Central Asian region, there are many, but it hardly makes sense to talk about each and every one of them. Some are simply present in the region but do not have a significant impact on Central Asian economies not to mention political decision-making.

The author considers it necessary to have a look at the centers of power that are not only implementing (or have implemented in the recent past) their alternative integration projects in relation to Central Asia, but also strongly influence the region’s economies, political decision-making and the process of building a new regional security framework. The key parameter here is the inability of Central Asian countries to ignore the proposals or positions of such centers of power on this or that issue due to various circumstances.

Each of these – significant – centers of power should possess the following critical features:

Such centers of power (in order of their influence on the economic and political processes in Central Asia, as well as political decision-making) include China, Russia, United States, Turkey and the European Union.

Global- and regional-level competition among these centers of power in fact characterizes the external factor specifics in Central Asia. The main dilemma for the countries of the region – while co-building an effective regional security system – is the answer to the question to what extent they are able, on the one hand, to take account of the objective contradictions among the centers of power and, on the other hand, not to yield to the temptation of “playing" on these contradictions.

This can be achieved only by joint efforts, based on throwing aside the ambition and admitting what we – Central Asian states – really are; what we can achieve jointly as opposed to separately from each other; and, what this unnecessary confrontation may lead to. Perhaps, this will allow the countries of the region understand that the main threats (including, regional ones) are associated with the “shambles in the heads” of certain politicians; and that the essence of the “collective security” concept lies precisely in acting together, at times standing back in favor of others, and accepting from one another what each of parties has to offer.